

















The paper analyzes dollarization in the sense of asset substitution, where a foreign currency
competes with local assets, especially domestic capital, as a store of value, the impact of dol-
larization on capital accumulation and output, and why economies remain dollarized long after
a successful inﬂation stabilization. We relate this dollarization hysteresis to a ﬁnancial inter-
mediation failure that happens during high inﬂation. We show that in dollarized countries,
inﬂation stabilization policies may not have any eﬀect on domestic capital accumulation, thus
preventing such policies from stimulating growth—i.e. dollarized economies are vulnerable to
“dollarization traps”.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: E40, E50, F41, E41
1 Introduction
Unoﬃcial ‘dollarization’ has become a pervasive phenomenon in many emerging market economies.
Discussions of the dollarization phenomenon have often focused on either oﬃcial dollarization,
where the country’s government abandons the domestic currency and replaces it with a “hard”
foreign currency (such as the U.S. dollar or euro),1 or the unoﬃcial currency substitution, i.e.
the competition between US dollars and the domestic currency as a medium of exchange.2 In
this paper, we focus on dollarization in the sense of asset substitution, where a foreign currency
1For a discussion of the pros and cons of full oﬃcial dollarization see Berg and Borensztein (2000). Chang and
Velasco (2002) examine analytically the welfare consequences of oﬃcial dollarization. Barro (1999) advocates oﬃcial
dollarization of the whole Latin America. Edwards (2001) and Edwards and Magendzo (2003) examine empirically
the eﬀects of oﬃcial dollarization for economic growth.
2The literature on currency substitution has been concerned with issues of real money demand, optimal money
growth, inﬂation tax and real exchange rate in the context of endowment inﬁnitely-lived representative agent models.
Diﬀerent authors adopt diﬀerent money demand speciﬁcations. Calvo (1985), Canzoneri and Diba (1992) and Imro-
horoglu (1996) put home and foreign currency in the utility function of the representative agent, Guidotti (1993) and
Agenor and Khan (1996) use a cash-in-advance framework where individuals are required to use domestic currency to
purchase domestic goods and foreign currency to purchase foreign goods. Finally, Engineer (2000) utilizes a Townsend
(1980) turnpike framework.
1competes with local assets, especially domestic capital, as a store of value.3 The paper assesses the
impact of dollarization on capital accumulation, a topic that has been neglected in the dollarization
literature.
Is partial unoﬃcial dollarization beneﬁcial or harmful to growth and welfare of economic agents?
The answer is not straightforward. On the one hand, dollarization enables agents to circumvent
costs associated with inﬂation and devaluations. On the other hand, dollarization tends to reduce
seigniorage revenues—and therefore may potentially lead to higher tax rates—and dollarization
may impair the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy. Perhaps more importantly, investing in foreign
currency holdings could substitute for domestic capital investment.
It is well understood and documented that economies become dollarized during episodes of
high inﬂation. However, disinﬂations are not necessarily followed by dedollarization. In particular,
Argentina, Bolivia, Peru, Russia, Ukraine and Uruguay remained highly dollarized long after the
inﬂation rate was brought down to single digits.4 The following table provides data on two diﬀerent
measures of dollarization, as well as inﬂation, in selected countries of the former Soviet Union in
2001.
–I n s e r tT a b l e1h e r e–
Not only do various measures of dollarization remain stubbornly high years after a successful
disinﬂation, but they also show an upward trend in all the countries listed in Table 1, according to
estimates of Feige (2003).
There have been two approaches to address the dollarization hysteresis paradox. The ﬁrst ap-
proach is to modify existing currency substitution models to include adjustment costs or network
externalities. Oomes (2003), Cuddington and Garcia (2002), Guidotti and Rodriguez (1992) and
Uribe (1997) developed models in which the cost of using a foreign currency for transactions nega-
Vegh (1995) and Sturzenegger (1997) explicitly model the production side of the economy. However, in their models
labor is the only input, and so there is no substitution between productive capital and dollars. Vegh (1995) adopts
a transaction technology (shopping time) approach, while Sturzenegger (1997) uses a cash-in-advance framework.
Recently several search theoretic models of money have incorporated dual (or multiple) currencies. These contri-
butions include Matsuyama et al. (1993), Shi (1995), Head and Shi (2003) and Zhou (1997).
3Here, we follow Calvo (1996, Chapter 8, p. 153) who deﬁnes currency substitution as “the use of foreign currency
as a means of exchange” and dollarization as “the use of foreign currency in any of its three functions: unit of account,
means of exchange, and, in particular, store of value.” (emphasis added).
4Brodsky (1997), Feige (2003), Feige and Dean (2002), Friedman and Verbetsky (2000), Guidotti and Rodriguez
(1992), Havrylyshyn and Beddies (2003), Kamin and Ericsson (2003), Mongardini and Mueller (1999), Peiers and
Wrase (1997), Sahay and Vegh (1996), Savastano (1996), Van Aarle and Budina (1995) describe the dollarization
experience of various Latin American and East European countries.
2tively depends on the share of market participants who use this currency. Once the economy gets
dollarized during high inﬂation, there is no beneﬁt for an individual market participant to switch
back to the domestic currency as long as the others continue using dollars. The limitation of this
approach is that it explains the use of a foreign currency as a medium of exchange, but not as a
store of value. However, it is the store-of-value function of money, and not the medium of exchange
role that explains the billions of dollars kept ”under the mattress” in Latin America and Eastern
Europe. In most of these countries retailers are obliged by law to accept the domestic currency
only, which limits the use of dollars as a medium of exchange.
The second approach is to explain the hysteresis by the lack of conﬁdence in domestic monetary
assets, resulting from past inﬂations, devaluations and bank failures (Feige, 2003). This approach
hinges on the assumption that economic agents make systematic mistakes by holding dollars “under
the mattress” and forfeiting a higher return on domestic monetary instruments. The “peso problem”
as a potential explanation is not consistent with very strong macroeconomic fundamentals in several
of these countries (including Peru and Russia in the early 2000s).
This paper presents an alternative explanation of the dollarization hysteresis paradox. We relate
it to the underdevelopment of the ﬁnancial system/ﬁnancial intermediation failure that happens
during the period of high inﬂation. The link between ﬁnancial underdevelopment and dollarization
has been noted in several descriptive papers, but it has never been modeled explicitly.5
Besides addressing the dollarization hysteresis paradox, our paper overcomes several limitations
of the existing literature on dollarization. There is very little research on substitution between dollar
denominated assets and domestic assets other than money.6 This is surprising, since the use of
foreign currency as a store of value usually precedes the use of foreign currency as a medium of
exchange (Calvo and Vegh, 1992, Heymann and Leijonhufvud, 1995). Another serious limitation of
the current dollarization literature is that it neglects the real eﬀects of dollarization. Speciﬁcally,
5E.g., Savastano (1996, p. 226) argues that “the relative importance of foreign currency as an inﬂation hedge will
be inversely related to the economy’s level of ﬁnancial development. An economy with a well-developed ﬁnancial
market is, in principle, capable of adapting rapidly to a high inﬂation environment by oﬀering a rich set of fairly
liquid, high-yield instruments denominated in domestic currency (‘near monies’) that preserve the real value of the
public’s portfolio.” Chile and, especially, Brazil are examples of countries that went through periods of high inﬂation
in the 1970s – 1990s, but avoided dollarization. These two economies arguably have the most sophisticated banking
systems in the South America.
6Several papers, including Kareken and Wallace (1981), Chang (1994), Sibert and Liu (1998), Tandon and Wang
(1999), Mourmouras and Russell (2000), analyze substitution between domestic and foreign money in the context of
endowment overlapping-generations models. In these models both competing monies serve as a store of value. The
focus of this literature is on relative money demand, inﬂationary ﬁnance of a given budget deﬁcit and capital controls
that governments (may) impose to protect the seigniorage base.
3most existing models analyze dollarization in the context of endowment economies; none of them
studies the interaction between dollarization and physical capital accumulation.
This paper aims to contribute to our understanding of the consequences of dollarization when
foreign currency is used as a store of value, and therefore competes with domestic capital accumu-
lation. Speciﬁcally, we study an overlapping-generations model in which agents may hold claims
to capital as well as dollars as stores of value, and they hold domestic currency to insure against
liquidity shocks, as in the models with spatial separation and limited communication (Champ et
al. (1996), Smith and Schreft (1997, 1998), and Espinosa-Vega and Yip (1999)).
In light of empirical evidence, any small, open–economy monetary growth model should have
the prediction that a rise in the steady state inﬂation rate is associated with a reduction (possibly
non-linear) in the domestic capital stock and domestic output, precisely the reverse of the “Mundell-
Tobin” eﬀect (see Barro (1996), Bruno (1995), Chari et al. (1995), Fischer (1993), Ghosh and
Phillips (1998), Khan and Senhadji (2001), and Sarel (1996)).7 Our model has this prediction.
However, as long as the marginal product of capital is diminishing, this will lead to a rise in the
real return to domestic capital, which in turn results in a shift away from investment in dollars and
toward capital. This “arbitrage problem” clearly contradicts the empirical evidence on dollarization
in high inﬂation economies; i.e. high inﬂation tends to raise the demand for dollars.
To address the arbitrage problem the paper assumes a non-convexity in production: when
the aggregate capital stock is high enough, the scale of production allows for eﬃcient ﬁnancial
intermediation and a modern technology with a marginal rate of return to capital higher than in
the unintermediated “primitive” technology that prevails under lower capital stocks. Our model
predicts that when the inﬂation rate is low, the capital stock and output are high enough, and the
eﬃcient intermediated technology is used. When the inﬂation rate rises above a certain threshold,
a ﬁnancial intermediation failure occurs, so that the economy “jumps” to an equilibrium with
a lower capital stock and the primitive intermediation technology. This feature of the model is
broadly consistent with the earlier theoretical and empirical work that shows that inﬂation, above
a certain threshold, negatively aﬀects ﬁnancial intermediation activities, and that the relationship
between them may be highly nonlinear.8
7As Gale (1983, p. 85) observes, “In an important sense, Tobin appears to have got his results backwards. When
the economy is modeled ‘properly’ - and what this means is bound to be controversial – the Tobin eﬀect is reversed.”
8For empirical evidence see Boyd et al. (2001), and for theoretical analyses see Azariadis and Smith (1996), Choi
et al. (1996), Boyd and Smith (1998), De Gregorio and Sturzenneger (1997), and Huybens and Smith (1998, 1999).
4Our model has three key predictions. First, for a range of inﬂation rates, there exists a steady
state equilibrium in which the eﬃcient technology (and no dollars) is used, as well as a steady
state equilibrium in which the ineﬃcient technology and dollars are used. Second, in the equilib-
rium where the ineﬃcient technology and dollars are used, the link between the rate of inﬂation
and capital accumulation is severed. This implies the hysteresis in dollarization ratios, capital
accumulation, and output, i.e., the central prediction of the model. It is possible for economies
to become stuck—for a range of inﬂation rates—in low output, technology induced “development
traps”, where the net marginal product of capital is the same as the return from holding dollars.
The only way to exit from such an equilibrium is to reduce inﬂation below a threshold level. Third,
the “dollarization trap” steady state equilibrium occurs only when inﬂation is falling, i.e., during
a disinﬂation.
These predictions are broadly consistent with the experience of many dollarized countries. In
particular, as Figure 1 shows, Bolivia, Russia, and Ukraine experienced signiﬁcant reductions in
output and increased dollarization during their spells of high inﬂation, and remained heavily dol-
larized when the inﬂation was brought down. In these countries, the recovery of output was slow
(or nonexistent) in the aftermath of stabilization. On the other hand, in Poland and Estonia,
dedollarization coincided with an output boom soon after the inﬂation rate fell below 30 % a year.
– Insert Figure 1 here –
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the model. Section 3
discusses production technologies. Section 4 discusses the demand for local currency in the presence
of liquidity shocks. Section 5 discusses steady-state equilibria and transitional dynamics. Section
6 considers the eﬀects of inﬂation on the equilibrium. Section 7 oﬀers concluding remarks.
2 The Model
The environment is similar to other overlapping-generations models with spatial separation and
limited communication, such as Champ et al. (1996), Schreft and Smith (1997, 1998) and Espinosa-
Vega and Yip (1999). This is a small open economy consisting of two identical locations (islands).
At each date, the locations are completely symmetric. In every period a continuum of agents of
measure 1 is born on each island. There is no population growth. Agents live for two periods.
In the ﬁrst period, agents are endowed with one unit of labor which they supply inelastically in
5the labor market and receive the perfectly competitive market wage, wt. They derive utility from
consumption in the second period of life only. Agents born in period t maximize their expected
utility function Ut = Et lnc2,t+1, where the ﬁrst subscript denotes the period of life and the second
- the timing of consumption.9
To transfer wealth between periods, agents can hold domestic currency, dollars, or invest in
productive capital. We assume that there is no inﬂation abroad, and that purchasing power parity
holds. Therefore, the gross return on dollars is always unity. We restrict our attention to equilibria
in which the return on domestic currency is strictly lower than the return on dollars and capital. In
other words, we abstract from deﬂation and liquidity traps here. However, we assume that dollars
and capital are perfect substitutes for the agents. Henceforth we will refer to them as capital market
assets (CMA).
At the end of each period a ﬁxed share of young agents, β<0.5, are relocated to another island.
Agents can take only the domestic medium of exchange (domestic currency) with them. Note that
our focus is on dollars as store of value and not their role as a medium of exchange. Thus, the
consumption good and CMA cannot be moved across islands. An agent has to make his investment
decision before he knows if he will be relocated. If he invests only in CMA, he will face starvation
in the second period if he is relocated. If he holds money, he will forfeit the higher return on other
assets that he could enjoy if he is not relocated.
It has been shown that in this environment competitive banks arise endogenously to provide
insurance against liquidity (relocation) risk. Banks issue demand deposits and hold portfolios
of currency and CMA. They use the currency to honor deposit withdrawals of agents who are
relocated. The explicit treatment of the competitive bank problem is presented in section 4. It
is important to note that these banks are not ﬁnancial intermediaries. They are merely insurance
providers.10
9The main results hold if we generalize the utility function to the family of constant-relative risk aversion utility
function, i.e., Ut =
c1−σ
2,t+1−1
1−σ ,w h e r eσ, the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion is greater than or equal to 1. This
generalization greatly complicates the algebra but does not aﬀect the predictions. The derivations of the main results
in the generalized CRRA case are available from the authors upon request.
10The spatial-separation-and-limited-communication framework is just one way to derive a positive demand for
real money balances such that an increase in the steady state inﬂation rate reduces the capital stock and output. A
feasible alternative is to have a three-period OLG model, in which agents work only in the ﬁrst period of life, consume
only in the third period, and the domestic currency must be held for at least one period prior to the purchase of
CMA. Therefore, agents hold the currency between the ﬁrst and the second period of life, and invest in CMA at
the end of the second period of life. This assumption is analogous to the standard cash–in–advance requirement,
however in this model it is the purchases of capital market assets, rather than consumption goods, that are subject
to a cash–in–advance constraint. The results that the model with this alternative setup generates are qualitatively
6The main diﬀerence between our environment and the setup of other spatial-separation-and-
limited-communication models is that we assume the existence of two productive technologies.
One technology is more eﬃcient, but it requires use of ﬁnancial intermediation—henceforth called
a “ﬁnancial center”—that incurs a ﬁxed cost to operate. The eﬃcient technology yields output in
per capita terms, y = Akα − φ,w h e r ek is the per capita capital stock, A>0a n dα ∈ (0,1) are
technology parameters, and φ is the cost to operate the ﬁnancial center. For simplicity, we abstract
from exogenous technological progress and endogenous growth.
The ability to operate the ﬁnancial center is the endowment of a special agent. There is just
one special agent in each generation on each island. This agent does not work when young, and
maximizes his expected consumption when old. His only source of income is the proﬁt of the
ﬁnancial center.
The other technology does not require a ﬁnancial center, i.e., the agents can use it directly, but
it is less productive. The less eﬃcient technology is y = Aγkα,w h e r eγ<1. Henceforth we will
refer to it as the “primitive technology.” Whichever technology is used, capital depreciates fully
each period.
There is a government that prints money at the end of every period and gives the seigniorage
as lump-sum transfers to the young agents staying on the same island. The gross growth rate of
nominal money supply is constant each period and is denoted ρ. Hence Mt = ρMt−1. In the steady
state, the gross inﬂation factor equals the gross rate of the money supply growth.
The key assumption of the model is the presence of two possible production technologies, one of
which requires the use of ﬁnancial intermediation—a “ﬁnancial center”—that is subject to a ﬁxed
cost to operate. This ﬁnancial center could literally be a ﬁnancial intermediation technology, a
stock market, or any other technology (e.g. computer center, power plant, infrastructure) that is
necessary to use if the eﬃcient production technology is to be utilized.
The timing of the events is as follows. First, the young agents of generation t are born. Second,
they work, earn wages, and deposit their wages with competitive banks. At the same time the old
agents receive their return on capital. Third, the old agents purchase the consumption good. At
the same time competitive banks make investment decisions, i.e. they allocate their funds between
the domestic currency and CMA. If the aggregate capital stock is large enough, the ﬁnancial center
identical to the results of the model presented in this paper. A version of the paper with this alternative setup is
available from authors upon request.
7operates and banks invest the CMA portion of their funds through the ﬁnancial center. Otherwise,
banks use the primitive technology and dollars. Fourth, relocation shocks are realized. Agents
who must relocate withdraw domestic currency from banks and travel to the other island. Fifth,
the government prints money and gives transfers to the agents who remain on the same island.11
Finally, the old agents of generation t − 1d i e .
3 The Financial Center
We assume that the ﬁnancial center, if it operates, is as an independent proﬁt-maximizing entity
that is created and owned by a special agent, who is the sole agent endowed with the ability to
operate the ﬁnancial center. Therefore the ﬁnancial center is a monopoly as long as it operates. If it
operates, it accumulates all resources available for investment from the competitive banking sector,
and invests those resources in the eﬃcient technology (this will be veriﬁed below). In other words,
it attracts the deposits of all banks, (who act on behalf of individual agents), and pays the banks
just the amount they would earn on their own with the primitive technology and dollars.12 We will
refer to the portfolio of CMA that banks have available to invest using the primitive technology as
their “autarkic portfolio”. The bank’s autarkic portfolio simply consists of the amount of deposits
banks have taken in from their customers.
Consider this autarkic portfolio and the return on it. There are two cases, corresponding to
whether the return on capital is greater than or equal to the return on dollars and thus whether
the autarkic portfolio consists of both capital and dollars or just capital.
3.1 Return on Capital Equals the Return on Dollars
In this case both capital and dollars are held in the autarkic portfolio, and thus the competitive
banks will split their CMA portfolio such that they invest in capital up to the point where the gross
marginal product of capital is unity, the same as the marginal return on dollars:
RT ≡ γAα(kT)α−1 =1 ( 1 )
11Even though the seigniorage revenue is given to young agents, they do not consume it until they get old, as only
old agents consume in this model.
12We assume that banks resolve their indiﬀerence between in using the primitive technology or the ﬁnancial center
favor of investing all of their deposits (CMA) with the ﬁnancial center. Alternatively, we could add a small premium
to the return oﬀered by the center to the banks without changing any of our results.
8where kT is the per capita capital stock.13 Solving for kT yields:
kT =( Aαγ)1/(1−α) (2)
Let d denote the total amount of deposits that individuals have placed in the competitive banking
sector, i.e. the total size of the autarkic portfolio. Then the case where banks’s autarkic portfolio
of CMA consists of both capital and dollars arises only if d>k T.
In this case, the banks contribute their assets to the ﬁnancial center, which in turn pays the
competitive banks a gross rate of return equal to 1, and appropriates the proﬁt. The cost of setting
up the ﬁnancial center is φ (in per capita terms). Therefore, assuming for the moment that the
ﬁnancial center invests only in capital, the center’s proﬁt in per capita terms is:
Πd = Aαkα − k − φ (3)
T h eb a n ko p e r a t e sa sl o n ga sΠ d ≥ 0, and shuts down when Πd becomes negative. Figure 2
illustrates the revenue and the expenses of the ﬁnancial center. Aαkα is the total return on capital,
i.e., the revenue of the center. k+φ are the expenditures of the center. Proﬁt is non-negative when
revenue is no less than the expenditures, i.e., k∗ ≤ k ≤ k∗∗,w h e r ek∗ and k∗∗ are the smaller and
the larger roots of the equation Aαkα − k − φ = 0, respectively. Finally, km =( Aα2)1/(1−α) is the
point where proﬁt is maximized.
We make two additional assumptions about the eﬃcient production technology, that ensure the
existence of a non-empty range of values for k, such that Πd > 0.
Assumption 1: k ≤ km, i.e, Aα2kα−1 − 1 > 0.
Assumption 2: Aα(Aα2)α/(1−α) − (Aα2)1/(1−α) − φ>0.
Assumption 1 guarantees that proﬁt of the ﬁnancial center positively depends on its scale of
operation (∂Πd
∂k = Aα2kα−1−1). We need this assumption to ensure that the ﬁnancial center makes
nonnegative proﬁt and operates when the capital stock is high (and when inﬂation rate is low, see
section 4), and shuts down when the capital stock is low. The corollary of Assumption 1 is that
the eﬃcient production technology is dynamically eﬃcient, i.e., Aαkα−1 > 1. Hence the ﬁnancial
center never uses dollars (dollars are always dominated in rate or return by the eﬃcient production
technology). Assumption 2 ensures that the proﬁt of the ﬁnancial center is positive at its maximum
13We denote the per capita capital stock as k
T, because this is the level of the capital stock in the dollarization
trap (T stands for trap).
9point km. Therefore, the equation Aαkα − k − φ = 0 has two positive real roots, and Πd ≥ 0f o r
k∗ ≤ k ≤ km.
Therefore, the ﬁnancial center operates, if d ≥ k∗, and shuts down if d<k ∗.
3.2 Return on Capital Exceeds Return on Dollars
In this case the autarkic portfolio of CMA contains no dollars, i.e. d ≤ kT. Thus, the total
return on the autarkic portfolio is Aαγdα > 1. This, in turn, implies that the ﬁnancial center, if it
operates, invests in capital only (since the return on capital exceeds the return on dollars). Thus,
its proﬁt is:
Π=Aαkα − Aαγkα − φ =( 1− γ)Aαkα − φ (4)
The ﬁnancial center operates if and only if Π ≥ 0, or
d ≥ ˜ k∗ ≡ φ1/α[(1 − γ)Aα]−1/α (5)
We can state the following result:
Lemma 1: A) If kT <k ∗,t h e nkT < ˜ k∗ <k ∗.
B) If kT >k ∗,t h e nk∗ < ˜ k∗ <k T.
C) if kT = k∗,t h e nkT = k∗ = ˜ k∗.
Proof: See appendix.
Therefore, the comparison of k∗,kT and ˜ k∗ can yield just these three cases. Note that the
ﬁnancial center operates and the autarkic portfolio does not contain dollars only in cases B) and
C), if ˜ k∗ ≤ d ≤ kT.
The ﬁndings of this subsection are summarized in Proposition 1:
Proposition 1: If k∗ >k T, the ﬁnancial center operates if and only if d ≥ k∗.I f k∗ ≤ kT,t h e
ﬁnancial center operates if and only if d ≥ ˜ k∗.
4 Demand for Domestic Currency
Analysis of the demand for money follows Champ et al. (1996), Smith and Schreft (1998), and
Espinosa-Vega and Yip (1999). Competitive banks arise endogenously to provide insurance against
liquidity shocks. Young agents deposit their savings with the banking system. Banks issue demand
deposits, and they hold a share of deposits in domestic money in order to meet liquidity needs
10of relocated agents. The remaining funds are invested in CMA (either directly, or through the
ﬁnancial center). Because of perfect competition in the banking industry, banks earn zero proﬁt,
and they set the deposit rates for agents who withdraw early (relocated agents) and for the rest of
the agents, so that the expected utility of a young agent is maximized:




2,t+1 is the consumption of an agent who is relocated, cs
2,t+1 is the consumption of an agent
who stays on his home island.












where λt is the share of deposits held in cash, wt is the wage income of an agent in period t, Rt is the
gross rate of return on autarkic portfolio, 1/πt is the gross rate of return on domestic currency, and
at+1 is the real value of the government transfer in period t+1 . 14 The maximization is conducted
with respect to λt, cm
t+1 and cs
t+1.




Equations (7)-(9) are a linear system in λt, cm
t+1 and cs
t+1. In the next section we show that λt is
always greater than zero, but less than one.
5 Competitive Equilibrium and SteadyStates
This section identiﬁes the possible equilibria. There are three possibilities for equilibria: the eﬃcient
technology is used; the primitive technology is used but agents do not hold dollars; and the primitive
technology is used and agents hold both dollars and capital.
14It is assumed that the government transfer occurs at the same time that agents are relocated, so relocated agents
miss out on receiving the transfer.
115.1 Equilibrium with the Eﬃcient Technologyand No Dollars
Six equations determine the competitive equilibrium of this economy when the eﬃcient technology
is used:
wt =( 1 − α)Akα
t (10)
Rt =1 i f kt+1 ≥ kT; Rt = αAγkα−1
t+1 if kt+1 <k T (11)
















Equations (10) and (11) deﬁne the values of the factor prices. Equation (12) describes the law
of motion of the capital stock: young agents deposit all their wage income with competitive banks,
and the banks invest share 1 − λt of deposits in capital. Equation (13) is the government budget
constraint. It states that the government expenditure, (1−β)at+1, equals real seigniorage revenue,
(ρ−1)λtwt
πt . Equation (14) is the ﬁrst-order condition of the competitive banks’ optimization problem
(9). Finally, equation (15) states that a share of the wage income of young agents of generation t
is acquired by the government and spent on the transfer, which equals (1 − β)at+1 in per capita
terms. The value of the transfer also equals the wage income, wt, net of the value of the assets
retained by the representative agent, kt+1 + λtwt
πt .
In every period t, kt is predetermined. The system (10)-(15) can be solved for Rt,k t+1,w t,a t+1,π t
and λt. Lemma 2 establishes the existence and uniqueness of the solution.
Lemma 2. The system (10)-(15) has a unique solution such that λt ∈ (0,1). Proof: See Appendix.
Taking into account that πt = ρ in the steady state and eliminating wt and at+1, the system















k =( 1 − λ)(1 − α)Akα (17)
R =1 i f k ≥ kT; R = αAγkα−1 if k<k T (18)
12The following proposition establishes the main comparative statics result.
Proposition 2: If the ﬁnancial center operates, an increase in the steady-state money supply growth
rate raises the share of bank assets held in domestic currency, and reduces the per capita capital
stock.
Proof: See Appendix.
The negative relationship between the steady-state inﬂation rate and the capital stock estab-
lished in the Proposition 2 is often termed the reverse Mundell-Tobin eﬀect.
Lemma 3 below establishes that the dynamical equilibrium analyzed above is stable, i.e.,i t
converges to the steady state.
Lemma 3. The steady state equilibrium described by the system (11)-(16) is stable.
Proof: See Appendix.
For k∗ >k T, the condition d ≥ k∗ is equivalent to k ≥ k∗ (since dollars are not held). This
allows us to calculate values of ρ compatible with the eﬃcient-technology steady-state equilibrium.
Speciﬁcally, it follows from k ≥ k∗, Proposition 2 and (16)-(18) that the equilibrium exists if and
only if:













Equation (20) is obtained by solving (16) for ρ taking into account that R =1i fk ≥ kT.
Equation (21) is obtained by solving (17) for λ for k = k∗.
If k∗ ≤ kT, the condition d ≥ ˜ k∗ is equivalent to k ≥ ˜ k∗ (since dollars are not held). This
allows us to calculate values of ρ compatible with the eﬃcient-technology steady-state equilibrium.
It follows from k ≥ ˜ k∗, Proposition 2 and (16)-(18) that the equilibrium exists if and only if:



















Equation (23) is obtained by solving (16) for ρ taking into account that R = αγAkα−1 if k ≤ kT.
Equation (24) is obtained by solving (17) for λ for k = ˜ k∗.
Note that whether k∗ is greater than or less than kT is a parametric restriction and thus only
one of the sets [1,ρ ∗]a n d[ 1 , ˜ ρ∗] is relevant for any given parameterization.
5.2 Equilibrium with the Primitive Technologyand No Dollars
The primitive technology is used if and only if the ﬁnancial center cannot make a proﬁt. From
Proposition 1 this happens whenever d<k ∗ if k∗ >k T, and whenever d<˜ k∗ if k∗ ≤ kT. Dollars
are not present in the autarkic portfolio, if and only if d ≤ kT. Hence, a steady state equilibrium
with no dollars occurs if d ≡ k<k T in case A (k∗ >k T), and if d ≡ k<˜ k∗ in cases B-C (k∗ ≤ kT).
Six equations determine the competitive equilibrium of this economy when the ineﬃcient tech-
nology is used:




















The system (26)-(31) is almost identical to the system (10)-(15). The two diﬀerences are in the
factor prices. Given that the ineﬃcient technology is used, the wage income expression has the
coeﬃcient γ in it. Furthermore, since by assumption dollars are not used, the return on CMA
is greater than or equal to unity, and it coincides with the return on capital using the ineﬃcient
technology.
In every period t, kt is predetermined. The system (26)-(31) can be solved for Rt,k t+1,w t,a t+1,π t
and λt. Lemma 4 establishes the existence and uniqueness of the solution.
14Lemma 4. The system (26)-(31) has a unique solution such that λt ∈ (0,1).
The proof mirrors the proof of Lemma 2 and is omitted.
Taking into account that πt = ρ in the steady state and eliminating wt and at+1, the system















k =( 1 − λ)(1 − α)Aγkα (33)
R = αAγkα−1 (34)
The following proposition establishes the main comparative statics result.
Proposition 3: If k<k T and the ﬁnancial center does not operate, an increase in the steady-state
money supply growth rate raises the share of bank assets held in domestic currency, and reduces
the per capita capital stock.
The proof mirrors the proof of Proposition 2 and is omitted.
Lemma 5. The steady state equilibrium described by the system (26)-(31) is stable.
The proof mirrors the proof Lemma 3 and is omitted.
For k∗ >k T, the condition d ≡ k<k T allows us to calculate values of ρ compatible with the
primitive-technology steady-state equilibrium in case A. It follows from k<k T, equations (32)-(34)















Equation (36) is obtained by solving (32) for ρ for R =1( a tk = kT,R = 1). Equation (37) is
obtained by solving (33) for λ for k = kT.
For k∗ ≤ kT, the condition d ≡ k<˜ k∗ allows us to calculate values of ρ compatible with
the primitive-technology steady-state equilibrium in cases B-C. It follows from k<˜ k∗,e q u a t i o n s

























Equation (39) is obtained by solving (32) for ρ. Equation (40) is obtained by solving (33) for λ.
5.3 Equilibrium with the Primitive Technologyand Dollars
A steady state equilibrium with dollars can exist only if kT <k ∗. Otherwise, the ﬁnancial center
starts operating at a capital stock below kT. T a k i n gi n t oa c c o u n tt h a tkt = kT and Rt =1 ,t h e
dynamics of the model are described by the following equations:





















where δt is the per capita stock of dollars. Equation (43) is the asset accumulation equation when
dollars are held. The right-hand side is the real value of labor income invested in CMA, and the left-
hand side is holdings of capital and dollars. The system (42)-(46) can be solved for at+1,w t,δ t,λ t
and πt.
Lemma 6. The system (42)-(46) has a unique solution, such that λt ∈ (0,1).
Proof: See Appendix.


















= kT + δ (48)
Equations (47)-(48) are obtained from (42)-(46) by substituting out wt and at+1 and taking
into account that πt = ρ in the steady state.
Proposition 4 presents the main comparative statics result of this section.
Proposition 4. A disinﬂation reduces the share of deposits held in domestic currency and increases
dollar holdings.
Proof: See Appendix.
A disinﬂation (a reduction in ρ) reduces λ, the share of the wage income held in domestic
currency, and therefore, increases the right-hand side of (48). The capital stock is pinned down by
the arbitrage condition, and is therefore independent of the inﬂation rate. Hence the disinﬂation
raises dollar holdings δ.
The following lemma shows that the model does not have any transitional dynamics in this
“dollarization trap” equilibrium.
Lemma 7. For a given rate of the money supply growth, the share of bank deposits held in domestic
currency, λ, the capital stock, k, the inﬂation rate, π, and dollar holdings, δ, are all time invariant
and equal to their steady-state values.
Proof: See Appendix.
Next we calculate the values of ρ compatible with this dollarization trap equilibrium. The
lowest possible money growth rate—denoted as ρ2—makes the right-hand side of (48) equal to k∗,











(1 − α)γA(kT)α (50)
17Here equation (49) is obtained from equation (47) solved for ρ, and equation (50) is obtained from
(48) solved for λ under the assumption that the right-hand side of (48) is equal to k∗.
Similarly, the highest possible money growth rate—denoted as ρ1—consistent with this equilib-
















Here equation (51) is obtained from equation (47) solved for ρ, and equation (52) is obtained from
(48) solved for λ under the assumption that the right-hand side of (48) is equal to kT.
ρ1 >ρ 2, because the right-hand side of (48) is monotonically decreasing in ρ. Hence it attains
the lower value, kT, at a higher level of the steady state inﬂation, than the higher value, k∗.
5.4 Summary
Two diﬀerent cases emerge depending on whether kT is greater than, less than, or equal to, k∗.
Case A. k∗ >k T. All three equilibria are feasible, and there may could be multiple equilibria for
a range of the money supply growth rates. If ρ ∈ (1,ρ 2), only the eﬃcient-technology equilibrium
exists. If ρ ∈ [ρ2,ρ 1) both the eﬃcient-technology steady state and the steady state with the
ineﬃcient technology and dollars are possible. Lemma 8 in the Appendix proves that ρ1 <ρ ∗.
Thus, for ρ ∈ [ρ1,ρ ∗) there exist two steady equilibria: the eﬃcient-technology equilibrium and the
ineﬃcient-technology-no-dollars equilibrium. Finally, for ρ ≥ ρ∗ the only equilibrium is with the
ineﬃcient technology and no dollars. Thus, the range of the gross inﬂation factor values [ρ2,ρ ∗]i s
compatible with two diﬀerent steady-state equilibria. Figure 4 illustrates this case.
Case B-C. kT ≥ k∗. The ineﬃcient-technology-and-dollars equilibrium is not feasible. If ρ ≤ ˜ ρ∗,
the eﬃcient-technology equilibrium exists. If ρ ≥ ˜ ρ2, the primitive-technology-no-dollars equilib-
rium exists. Therefore the range of the gross inﬂation factor values [˜ ρ2,ρ ∗] is compatible with two
diﬀerent steady-state equilibria, one of which uses the eﬃcient technology and on which uses the
ineﬃcient technology (and no dollars). Figure 5 illustrates this case.
186 Dynamics of Inﬂation and Disinﬂation
6.1 Qualitative Features of a Dollarization Trap
A dollarization trap arises only if k∗ >k T. In this case, assume that inﬂation is low, but rising.
The economy starts at point A and gradually moves to point B as shown in Figure 4. Along the
way the eﬃcient technology is used, but the capital stock is falling due to higher inﬂation. Any
temporary deviation from the steady state equilibrium dies out, because steady states are stable.
If the inﬂation rate exceeds ρ∗, a bifurcation takes place. The ﬁnancial center shuts down, and
agents have to use the primitive technology instead. The economy “jumps” from point B to point
C. Along the trajectory D-F, there is still a negative relationship between the inﬂation rate and the
capital stock. Therefore, a disinﬂation raises the capital stock above ˆ k, the level of capital stock
at C. However, if the inﬂation rate falls below ρ1, the investment and output recovery halts. The
economy is stuck in a trap, where the level of the capital stock is pinned down by the return on
capital. Disinﬂation translates not into a larger capital investment, but into larger dollar holdings.
Hence our model is consistent with the empirical evidence that falling inﬂation sometimes coexists
with a rising dollarization. Only when the inﬂation rate falls to ρ2, another bifurcation takes place,
the ﬁnancial center resumes operations, and the capital stock “jumps” from kT to k2.
It is important to note that because of the multiplicity and stability of equilibria, the level of
the capital stock (and output) during disinﬂation is lower than the level during rising inﬂation at
the same inﬂation rate. Moreover, as the disinﬂation progresses (as the economy moves from D to
E), the gap rises and reaches its maximum when the inﬂation rate falls to ρ2.
6.2 Dollarization Trap and Financial Development
What factors aﬀect the likelihood of a dollarization trap? The trap arises only if k∗ >k T, therefore
all the factors that reduce k∗ relative to kT makes the trap less likely. In particular, lemma 9 below




In ﬁgure 1, a reduction in φ shifts the expenditure line of the ﬁnancial center, k +φ,d o w n ,a n d
hence the point of intersection of this line with the revenue curve Aαkα shifts to the left. This
ﬁnding is very intuitive. φ is inversely related to the level of ﬁnancial development. Therefore, a
19more developed ﬁnancial system makes a dollarization trap less likely. As φ → 0, we have k∗ → 0
as well, and the dollarization trap becomes impossible.
7C o n c l u s i o n
This paper studies the link between inﬂation, the demand for foreign currency, or “dollars,” as a
store of value, and capital accumulation. Our principal aim in the paper is to identify circumstances
which can explain key empirical facts in dollarized countries. These empirical facts are that inﬂation
is a main cause of dollarization, that dollarization coincides with adverse real economic performance,
and that both the level of dollarization and the performance of the real economy are very slow to
reverse following inﬂation stabilization.
The key assumption in the paper is that the eﬃciency of the production technology depends
positively on the level of capital accumulation. This assumption appears in slightly diﬀerent form
in various endogenous growth models. In our model, this assumption is critical for explaining
dollarization hysteresis. The reason is that, to be consistent with the stylized facts in dollarized
economies, a suﬃciently high inﬂation rate must reduce the marginal product of capital, decrease
capital accumulation, and induce a higher demand for dollars. This is impossible if there is a single
neoclassical production technology.
There are three main implications of the model. First, there exist steady states with a relatively
high capital stock, low dollarization and low inﬂation, as well as steady states with a relatively lower
capital stock, higher inﬂation, and substantial dollarization. Second, for a range of intermediate
inﬂation rates, there co-exist a steady state equilibrium in which the eﬃcient technology (and no
dollars) is used and a steady state equilibrium in which the ineﬃcient technology and dollars are
used. Third, in the equilibrium where the ineﬃcient technology and dollars are used, the link
between the rate of inﬂation and capital accumulation is severed. This implies that hysteresis in
dollarization ratios, capital accumulation, and output is a central prediction of the model. It is
possible for economies to become stuck—for a range of inﬂation rates—in low growth, technology
induced “development traps”, where the net marginal product of capital is the same as the return
from holding dollars. The only way to exit from such an equilibrium is to reduce inﬂation below a
threshold level.
20Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1.
It is easy to verify that Πd > Π if and only if k<k T,Π d < Π if and only if k>k T,a n dΠ d =Π
if and only if k = kT.
First, consider the case when both k∗ and ˜ k∗ are smaller than kT. We know that Πd > Πf o r
k<k T. Therefore, Πd(˜ k∗) > Π(˜ k∗)=0 . G i v e nt h a tΠ d(k)i si n c r e a s i n gi nk, the root of the
equation Πd(k) = 0, deﬁned as k∗, is smaller than ˜ k∗. Hence k∗ < ˜ k∗ <k T.
Second, consider the case when both k∗ and ˜ k∗ are greater than kT. We know that Π > Πd
for k>k T. Therefore, Πd(˜ k∗) < Π(˜ k∗)=0 . G i v e nt h a tΠ d(k)i si n c r e a s i n gi nk, the root of the
equation Πd(k) = 0, deﬁned as k∗, is greater than ˜ k∗. Hence kT < ˜ k∗ <k ∗.
Third, we show the impossibility of the case k∗ <k T < ˜ k∗. If this inequality were true, then
Πd(˜ k∗) < 0 (because Πd(k) < Π(k)f o rk>k T and ˜ k∗ is deﬁned as the root of Π(k) = 0). Therefore,
k∗ > ˜ k∗. This is a contradiction. The impossibility of the case ˜ k∗ <k T <k ∗ can be shown in a
similar way.
Fourth, we show that if ˜ k∗ = k∗,t h e n˜ k∗ = k∗ = kT.I fk = ˜ k∗ = k∗,t h e nΠ ( k)=Π d(k)=0 .
Solving Π(k)=Π d(k)f o rk yields k = kT.
Finally, we show that if kT equals either k∗,o r˜ k∗, then it equals the other critical value as well.
Suppose that kT = k∗ ( t h ec a s ew h e nkT = ˜ k∗ c a nb ep r o v e di nas i m i l a rw a y ) .T h e n ,Π d(kT)=0 .
However, we already know that for k = kT,Π d(k)=Π ( k). Hence, Π(kT) = 0. Therefore, kT is the
root of Π(k) = 0, and kT = ˜ k∗. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2.
We will ﬁrst show that πt = ρ. In words, the inﬂation rate equals the money growth rate not
only in the steady state equilibrium, but also in a neighborhood of it.
Combining (13) and (15), we get:
λtwt(ρ − 1)
πt




Equation (53) can be rewritten as:
ρλtwt
πt
= wt − kt+1 (54)
21Combining (54) with (12) yields:
ρ
πt
λtwt = wt − (1 − λt)wt = λwt, (55)
which simpliﬁes to
πt = ρ (56)

















kt+1 =( 1 − λt)(1 − α)Akα
t (59)
Rt =1i fkt+1 ≥ kT;= αAγkα−1 if kt+1 <k T (60)
We next show the existence and uniqueness of a triplet λt,k t+1,R t that satisﬁes the system
(58)-(60). Equation (59) describes a continuous negative relationship between kt+1 and λt,s u c h





β + Rt − (1 − 1
ρ)
(61)








β + Rt − (1 − 1
ρ)
2 < 0 (62)









Therefore the system (58)-(60) can be shown graphically using the λt – kt+1 plane. Equation
(59) is represented as a downward-sloping curve in Figure 3. Given the result (63), equations (58)
22and (60) are represented as an upward-sloping curve. Hence the two curves intersect in at most
one point. Furthermore, using (61), we can show that
lim
kt+1→0
λt = β<1 (64)
Hence, by continuity, these two curves intersect in exactly one point, and λt < 1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2.
Totally diﬀerentiating (16) yields:
1 − β
β






Equations (17) and (18) imply a negative relationship between k and λ and non-positive rela-
tionship between k and R. Hence,
dR = φdλ (66)


















β − (1 − λ) > 0, because from equation (16)
(1 − β)λ
β





























Proof of Lemma 3.















kt+1 =( 1 − λt)(1 − α)Akα
t (71)
Rt =1 i fkt+1 ≥ kT; αAγkα−1
t+1 bi fkt+1 <k T (72)



























2 < 0 (74)
Totally diﬀerentiating equation (71) in a neighborhood of the steady state, we get:



















∂kt+1A(1 − α)kα (76)
The last transformation relies on the fact that in the steady state:
k =( 1− λ)A(1 − α)kα−1





∂kt < 1, and the dynamical system converges to the steady state equilibrium.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 6.
First of all, it is straightforward to combine equations (43), (44) and (45) to show that πt = ρ
(the procedure is exactly the same as in the proof of Lemma 2). Hence we can replace equations










24Furthermore equation (42) uniquely determines wt. If we substitute (44) into (45), we get an







Finally, substituting (78) into (43) gives us the value for δt. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4.
Equation (78) shows that λt is time invariant in a neighborhood of the steady state for a given
value of ρ. Furthermore, it shows that λ is positively related to ρ. A reduction in λ following a
disinﬂation, increases the right-hand side of (48), and therefore, raises the dollar holdings δ. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 7.
It follows from equation (78) that λt is time invariant in a neighborhood of the steady state for
a given value of ρ. Therefore, the model does not have any transitional dynamics. The return on
dollars determines the level of the capital stock. Hence kt+1 = kT at every point in the neighborhood
of the steady state with dollars. Equation (48) determines the value of δt for kt = kT and λt = λ(ρ).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 8.
We will prove the lemma by contradiction. Let’s assume that ρ1 >ρ ∗.I nt h a tc a s e ,
1 − λ∗ > 1 − λ1 (79)
By deﬁnition of ρ∗,
[1 − λ∗]A(1 − α)(k∗)α = k∗, (80)
or
[1 − λ∗]A(1 − α)(k∗)α−1 = 1 (81)
By deﬁnition of ρ1,
[1 − λ1]Aγ(1 − α)(kT)α = kT (82)
We know that kT =( Aαγ)1/(1−α). Substituting into (82), we get:




25From (79), (81), and (83), it follows that
A(1 − α)(k∗)α−1 =
1








Aα(k∗)α−1 < 1 (85)
This result contradicts the assumption of dynamic eﬃciency of the eﬃcient technology. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 9.
By deﬁnition of k∗,
Aα(k∗)α = k∗ + φ (86)
Totally diﬀerentiating equation (86), we get:








The last equation holds by Assumption 1. Q.E.D.
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35Table 1. Dollarization in Selected FSU Countries in 2001.
Country CDI DI Annual Inﬂation
Latvia 67.5 30.8 2.5 %
Lithuania 34.7 32.9 1.3 %
Russia 73.5 24.5 21.6 %
Ukraine 37.8 19.4 6.1 %
Armenia 68.1 50.3 3.4 %
Azerbaijan 82.3 48.8 1.5 %
Georgia 80.2 44.9 4.7 %
Kazakhstan 89.7 47.5 8.4 %
Kyrgyz Rep. 52.3 25.2 7.0 %
Turkmenistan 54.4 39.9 11.4 %
CDI - Comprehensive Dollarization Index = (foreign currency + foreign currency bank deposits) /
(M2 + foreign currency in circulation)
DI - Dollarization Index =
= Foreign currency bank deposits / M2.
Source: Feige (CES, 2003 and Havrylyshyn and Beddies, CES, 2003).
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